Understanding debt structure and becoming value a distressed asset investor is the other end of the spectrum in becoming very rich as an investor; the opposite side is to find what the next next big thing would be as a selected equity early stage investor. In both, it is important to do own study and go for what you believe in.
Private equity: Apollo’s charge to the top
A deep understanding of debt has helped the firm become the industry’s most powerful player
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Late last year Apollo Global Management sold its last chunk of LyondellBasell, the chemical company that many had given up for dead years earlier. With that final sale, Apollo’s profits from its buyout of the company reached $10bn, sealing what was probably the greatest private equity deal of all time.
It was also a very risky and unusual deal. It did not start with an auction, as many private equity deals do. Instead, Apollo gained control of Lyondell by buying up parts of the company’s $25bn debt load over many months. It was able to buy the debt at steep discounts because there was so much of it – and because nobody else would touch it. Apollo’s great rival, Blackstone Group, avoided troubled companies such as Lyondell in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, Blackstone executives say. But Apollo and Leon Black, its founder, could not get enough of the debt.
As the crisis worsened many competitors bet that Lyondell and other troubled companies in its portfolio would bring Apollo down. But Apollo’s staff knew the chemicals industry intimately. The investment firm kept buying debt, and for 200 days the price kept falling.
“Earnings went to nothing with blinding speed. The ratings dropped with blinding speed. The company ran out of money at blinding speed,” says Josh Harris, who along with Marc Rowan and Mr Black founded Apollo.
“That was the defining moment in the success of Apollo,” says Steve Schwarzman, Blackstone’s founder, who has been competing with Apollo for more than 20 years. “Most people freeze but Leon went into action. You absolutely have to have a cast-iron stomach and Leon apparently does. He is unbelievably smart.”
When Apollo revealed last week that its three founders had earned more than $1bn in 2013 – more than the founders of any of their rivals, who also had strong years – it cemented the investment firm’s ascendancy. Its rise was powered by an intimate understanding of debt, a crucial advantage at a time when all the big buyout firms believe that the opportunity for future growth is in the provision of debt.
“We traverse downturns,” says Mr Black, who pocketed $546.3m. “Since Apollo was founded in 1990, we have been through four downturns and 40 per cent of all of our money has been invested in down cycles, when everyone else shut down.”
Apollo executives say that if you buy debt at 70 cents on the dollar, you have more chances of being lucky than if you buy at 100 cents. But that does not mean the debt won’t go to 40 cents. You cannot buy so much that you go out of business. It can be very difficult to manage the process…
Financial Bigs Face Off in the Ring at Caesars
A heavyweight fight could soon break out over Caesars Entertainment as the controlling shareholders of the casino company, private-equity giants Apollo Global Management and TPG, square off in the ring against Caesars bondholders. The purse: some $19 billion in debt.
Two bondholder groups have sent letters in the past few weeks to Caesars (ticker: CZR), arguing that a wholly owned subsidiary, Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., is hopelessly indebted and that various asset sales and transfers from CEOC to other Caesars entities in the past year be reversed.
The reversal request first came in a letter last month from a law firm representing a group of CEOC’s second-lien bondholders, stating that the operating company, which is burning through about $1 billion in cash a year, is “insolvent” and that the asset transfers, mainly involving hotel-casinos, amount to a “piecemeal liquidation” done for “inadequate compensation.” The deals, they claim, are “voidable under applicable law.”…
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